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Armaments Decision-Making: Are European States Really Different? 
Abstract 
When states make decisions on armaments policy, it is generally agreed they try to achieve 
combinations of foreign, security, industrial, economic and technological policy goals 
alongside equipping their armed forces as efficiently as possible. It is however consistently 
argued in both the defence economics and EU studies literature, that for European states things 
are (or should be) different. This article contributes to this debate by bringing together these 
disparate literatures to critically examine the proposition that the existence of a semi-
regionalised European defence economy fundamentally changes state calculations on 
armaments policy. It critically examines the two main claims made about behavioural change; 
that European states accept a liberalised European defence market governed by the EU and 
make armaments decisions on a value for money basis or; that defence interdependence is so 
advanced that European states no longer need to consider their national interests as these are 
subsumed in the European interest. The article then considers an alternative perspective, that 
state behaviour has not changed but is restricted by the existence of a European defence market 
that intentionally or not works to protect the interests of the biggest European arms producing 
states. 
Introduction 
Krause suggests that there are three reasons for states to maintain a military industry; the pursuit 
of victory or survival in war, the pursuit of power and identity and the pursuit of wealth.1 If as 
Realist scholars and many policy-makers assume, the international system is innately anarchic, 
then Krause’s considerations could be understood as the underlying drivers of a state’s 
armament strategies. They are likely to be foundational in terms of what armaments 
relationships are built with other states and foreign defence firms. It is accepted in much of the 
defence economics literature that being as self-sufficient as possible in armaments is therefore 
2 
 
often a goal for states. Bitzinger notes that emerging arms producing states also exhibit this 
policy behaviour, observing a tendency to pursue techno-nationalist goals.2 
What though if your regional order features highly institutionalised cooperative relationships 
in terms of both economic and security policies? Would this change the calculations states 
make? If a state no longer fears war with its neighbours, derives its identity and power, at least 
in part, from its membership in the European Union (EU) or the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO) and is faced with public expenditure needs other than defence, will it act 
differently? Does the Article V NATO security guarantee mean that states are no longer 
troubled by security of supply questions? Does the concept of strategic autonomy now only 
matter at the European rather than national level? Do highly integrated economies and 
established practices of cooperating on economic policy in the EU mean that defence firms are 
no longer seen as any different to other firms, and that therefore procurement decisions are 
made predominantly on a value-for-money basis?  It is consistently argued in both the defence 
economics and EU studies literature, that for European states things are (or should be) different 
and that cooperation on armaments should prevail over national interests. This article 
contributes to this debate by bringing together these disparate literatures, to critically examine 
the proposition that the existence of a semi-regionalised European defence economy 
fundamentally changes state calculations on armaments policy. 
At least since the 1990s, if not before, Krause’s assumptions about how states rationalise their 
armament policies have been challenged by the pressures of increasing European integration, 
involvement in NATO and the internationalisation of defence firms.3 Nation states have needed 
to reconcile their national armament strategies with the necessity of co-operating at the 
bilateral, multi-lateral or international organisation level as well as coping with the 
globalisation of technological innovation.4 Like other states, they try to achieve combinations 
of foreign, security, industrial, economic and technological policy goals alongside equipping 
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their armed forces as efficiently as possible, but in an unusual regional environment. One might 
expect a continent with both a long-established military alliance and highly integrated 
economies and policy-making machineries to also have a highly integrated defence economy. 
However, the European defence market is also frequently criticised for being both fragmented 
(in terms of both supply and demand) and for remaining protectionist, thus resulting in sub-
optimal defence capabilities for all European states.5 After a series of moves towards defence 
industrial consolidation in the 1990s produced four large prime contractors, BAE Systems, 
Airbus Group (formerly EADS), Thales and Finmeccanica, progress slowed. A proposed 
merger between the then EADS and BAE Systems in 2012 was blocked by Germany, and 
although the December 2015 completion of the Franco-German merger of military land 
industry suppliers, Nexter and KMW, may mark the start of a new wave, the industrial 
landscape remains surprisingly national especially in naval industry.6 Similarly, despite 
multiple EU and NATO initiatives, programmes and in the EU case regulation, progress on the 
demand side has also been minimal. The European Defence Agency (EDA) reported that from 
2008 to 2013 collaborative defence procurement spending fell, although the most recent 
estimated figures (for 2014 and 2015) show some improvement.7 
What is interesting however, is that despite the problems, the concepts of a European Defence 
Equipment Market (EDEM) or a European Defence Technological and Industrial Base 
(EDTIB) are rarely questioned. This is not the case in other regions of the world, even where 
defence alliances exist. Moreover, the European region has no credible new entrants 
challenging its main defence industrial producing states, although one might have expected 
some to emerge from the former Warsaw Pact states.8  
In common with the other papers in this special issue, this paper seeks to uncover the main 
factors impacting decision-making on the defence economy within Europe. In proposing that a 
semi-regional defence economy now exists, the paper is not arguing that European states no 
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longer make national defence economic decisions (they clearly do), but it accepts that they 
make those decisions in the context of a growing EU regulatory framework, against the 
backdrop of capability planning processes in both NATO and the EU, often within specific 
agencies and bilateral / multilateral agreements for armaments cooperation and with the 
knowledge of the security guarantees made by both NATO (Article 5) and the EU (Article 
42(7) TEU). The paper will begin by a brief overview of the key themes in the literature on the 
Europeanisation of the armaments sector, from which it will derive hypotheses to test whether 
the behaviour of European states has altered.  
Competing Claims over Behavioural Change 
The literature and perspectives reviewed in this section are EU-centric and come largely from 
the field of political science. This reflects the comparative neglect of NATO in recent years by 
those working on European security issues, but also a longer term lack of interest in defence 
economy issues within the alliance with a few notable exceptions.9 Nor has there been much 
interest in the question of how or why NATO might influence behavioural change by states on 
armaments policy. The interest from defence economists in NATO as an institution has been 
to see it as a mechanism for correcting market failure or improving market operation, and 
indeed view its record on equipment standardisation as one of failure.10 Sandler and Hartley 
see national governments’ choices on whether (or not) to cooperate on armaments within 
NATO as a cost-benefit analysis, suggesting in other words, that European cooperation on 
armaments policy is a matter of rational decision-making – behavioural change should occur if 
there is a rational case for sacrificing some national goods in return for a collective good.11 
This however seems to discount the highly political motivations for armaments policy decision-
making – as Fevolden and Tvetbråten argue economic fallacies may in fact make political 
sense.12 
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In recent years there has been significant growth in the EU’s role in armaments policy. While 
the literature rarely directly addresses the extent of state behavioural change due to this new 
policy environment, and as De Vore has argued does not engage with the existing literature on 
armaments policy-making, it does however offer some propositions about what might motivate 
behavioural change.13 From this literature, the paper develops two competing perspectives and 
derives hypotheses to test them. These are complemented with a third perspective that draws 
explicitly on Krause’s work on state behaviour suggesting that structural constraints are a more 
important driver of state behaviour in the European context than positive behavioural change.14 
The first perspective draws on the role of the EU’s supranational institutions has played in 
framing the way defence economics questions are understood in Europe. Guay, for example, 
argues that since the 1990s, the European Commission has played a growing role in the shaping 
of the European defence industry and the European defence equipment market and that this is 
further evidence for the neo-functionalist view of the European policy process – i.e. policy 
action by the European Commission in one area leads in time to a spill-over in adjacent policy 
areas or industry sectors.15 In this case, European Commission civilian policy actions in the 
areas of competition policy, science and technology and public procurement, have led to the 
emergence of defence industry initiatives. More recently, Blauberger and Weiss have also 
stressed the role that the European Court of Justice played in setting the limits to defence 
derogations from the Single Market, and the way the Commission has used these judgements 
to carve out this regulatory and enforcement role.16 Other authors have addressed the role of 
the Commission in trying to frame or organise defence economic matters in ways that allowed 
it a regulatory role.17 While those articles stressed the contested nature of the Commission’s 
attempts, Britz’s later work stressed the ultimate success of the market frame.18 She argues that 
Europeanisation of armaments policy can best be understood as a process of marketisation, 
namely a convergence in national policies around liberal norms like privatisation, cost-
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effective defence procurement (e.g. the UK’s Smart Procurement initiative) and open defence 
markets, that in turn leads them to support Commission liberalisation proposals. Strikwerda 
also finds some evidence of this in her study of the member states’ reaction to the Commission 
proposal for a security and defence procurement directive.19 
If this perspective is accurate, then we might expect that European states accept that the rigours 
of the market will determine the destiny of ‘their’ defence firms. In other words, this means 
that one side of Adams’ iron triangle, the link between state and defence firm has now gone.20 
This leads to the following hypotheses: 
1a) national defence procurement decisions would be made on a value for money basis 
to maximise military capabilities, and  
1b) that the role of EU supranational institutions to set and enforce the rules for this 
liberalised market has widespread acceptance. 
The second perspective is that European states have now moved from a national to a European 
level understanding of defence. As Mérand has argued, as the European security and defence 
field has been institutionalised, the practices, social representations and power relations of 
security and defence actors are fundamentally challenged.21 Joana and Smith, suggest for 
instance that negotiations on the A400M transporter aircraft collaborative project were ‘heavily 
marked by a change in the social representation of European cooperation in the arms field’.22 
What they suggest is that the growing importance of the EU’s Common Security and Defence 
Policy (CSDP) suggests increased solidarity on defence (that applies also to armaments) that 
might change state behaviour. On the defence industry level, the existence of European not just 
national champions means shifts of loyalties. Member states could be willing to give up 
national defence industrial capacity in order to maintain overall capacity in the EU. The 
economic logic for armaments collaboration would be widely accepted in terms of 
collaboration on research and procurement, and that agreements on security of supply and 
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reciprocity would give states the confidence to pool and share military capabilities.23 Giegerich 
thought that the financial crisis and the defence cuts that it brought might give added 
momentum to this.24  
If this perspective is accurate, we might expect that European states have accepted (potentially 
for purely economic reasons) that the European defence interest subsumes their national 
interests. It leads to the following hypotheses: 
2a) That rising levels of cooperation on research and procurement can be seen, defence 
industrial mergers encouraged and the end of national (but not European level) 
protectionist measures observed, and, 
2b) that increased trust and solidarity mean that defence interdependence through 
measures like pooling and sharing and specialisation is accepted at the European level. 
The third perspective comes from the defence economics literature and suggests that the 
behavioural changes in European states are best understood by the proposition that since the 
1990s, the system has essentially been captured by those states, who were at that stage defined 
as second-tier suppliers, and were intent on maintaining that status. Krause defines the structure 
of the global arms transfer system thus:  
‘first-tier suppliers innovate at the technological frontier, second-tier suppliers 
produce (via the transfer of capacities) weapons at the technological frontier and 
adapt them to specific market needs, third-tier suppliers copy and reproduce existing 
technologies (via transfer of design) but do not capture the underlying process of 
innovation or adoption’.25 
Krause argues that in Europe, this second tier comprises the UK, France and Germany, with 
the possible additions of Italy, Spain and Sweden.26 Moves to respond to US defence industrial 
consolidation in the 1990s such as the Framework Agreement on defence industrial 
restructuring (signed by the six), or the UK, France, Germany and Italy’s agreement to set up 
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OCCAR (the multilateral procurement management agency) set these states apart from other 
EU and NATO European member states. Arguably, a case can be made that the subsequent EU 
initiatives merely follow the directions set by this group.27 Certainly, despite rhetoric to the 
contrary, both the Commission and the EDA’s actions, seem largely supportive of these 
second-tier producers and the large prime contractors that ‘belong’ to them, leaving smaller 
producers with little choice but to comply with an unfavourable regulatory regime.28 
Meanwhile, these second-tier suppliers tend to ignore directives they find awkward and opt out 
of real participation in EDA activity.29 They can do this because the EDEM is so distorted by 
the presence of a few big players that the large number of small ones are easily kept on the 
fringes.30 
If this final perspective is accurate, then we must assume that capture of the system is possible 
by a few large players, and that others accept (if unhappily) this status quo. From this we can 
derive the following hypotheses: 
3a) That the interests of the second-tier suppliers are so predominant that they comprise 
the vast majority of the EDEM and EDTIB, and thus system level capture is possible, 
and 
3b) that the market and regulatory regime distortion is such that smaller states are 
unable to act in their own interests, and thus are forced to accept the status quo. 
The rest of this paper will investigate the evidence for and against these six hypotheses in turn, 
starting with those linked to marketisation and moving through the three perspectives in the 
order presented above, before drawing conclusions. 
Acceptance of Marketisation 
1a) national defence procurement decisions would be made on a value for money basis 
to maximise military capabilities, and  
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1b) that the role of EU supranational institutions to set and enforce the rules for this 
liberalised market has widespread acceptance. 
In the 1990s the liberalisation logic to the EU’s Single Market programme spread to public 
procurement, with many European states adopting governance strategies from New Public 
Management. Falling defence budgets after the end of the Cold War raised interest in 
improving the cost effectiveness of defence procurement. Some predicted that this would bring 
the end of domestic preference in defence procurement, and strengthen the role of the military 
in Adams’ iron triangle, resulting in the opening of domestic markets to foreign suppliers 
(expected to be mainly American).31 The establishment of OCCAR was meant to remove 
protectionism from collaborative procurement and entrench this commercial approach.32 
Britz has argued that the acceptance of market norms in defence procurement has become 
widespread, and that this has in turn allowed the European Commission to begin to regulate 
using a market-driven approach.33 Work in this vein tends to draw particularly on the Swedish 
case, where its willingness to accept foreign acquisitions of Swedish defence firms without 
conditions has been noted.34 Another example, is Belgium, which voluntarily abandoned the 
use of offsets from 2001-04 to save money, but which led to substantial job losses in Belgian 
defence firm.35 However, the Belgian case is interesting in that it did not last. Hoeffler suggests 
that while evidence of marketisation can be seen to varying degrees in many European states, 
the adoption may well be partial or temporary.36 Castellacci et al make a similar point in a 
comparison of Norway and Sweden.37 Even the most enthusiastic proponent of marketisation 
in the 1990s, the UK, with its Smart Procurement initiatives, has reverted to more 
interventionist defence industrial strategies.38 
Nor can it be argued that the European market has been substantially opened to foreign 
suppliers. Kluth has examined the procurement of missiles and defence electronics by the UK, 
France, Germany and Italy in the 1980s and then from 2000 to the present day.39 He has found 
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evidence of abandonment of domestic suppliers in favour of other European suppliers, although 
in the missile sector this is largely accounted for by the emergence of MBDA, a European 
champion and near monopoly supplier with roots in all four states. What is interesting though 
is Kluth’s finding that although the United States supplied a substantial amount of equipment 
in the 1980s in these sectors, its firms are barely represented from 2000 onwards.40 In part this 
may reflect negative experiences of both transatlantic collaborative projects (e.g. F-35) and off-
the-shelf purchases (e.g. the UK and Chinook helicopters). Kiss also reports that disappointing 
experiences with offsets in the 1990s, has lessened the enthusiasm of Central and East 
European countries for purchasing from the USA to show their pro-NATO foreign policy 
stances.41  
The biggest recent European collaborative project, the A400M transport aircraft, despite being 
explicitly framed as a test for the commercial approach, was in fact an example of 
protectionism, with a European engine consortium led by Rolls Royce, being chosen over a 
better value product from Pratt-Witney.42 According to SIPRI imports by states in Europe 
decreased by 36 per cent between 2007–11 and 2012–16, with the region accounting for 11 per 
cent of total global imports.43 The biggest non-European suppliers were the United States and 
Russia, but both with decreasing overall shares of the European market suggesting that neither 
foreign policy nor value for money motivations for defence procurement are currently strong. 
This suggests that the acceptance of marketisation is at best limited to European rather than 
national purchases, and that hypothesis 1a is therefore not proven. 
Turning to the second hypothesis that there is widespread acceptance of the European 
Commission setting the rules for and enforcing a liberalised EDEM, again the picture is rather 
mixed. A series of studies on the adoption of two directives (on procurement and intra-EU arms 
transfers) that exist thus far, have shown that states have accepted regulation even when it 
arguably went against their initial preferences and interests.44 However, this picture is perhaps 
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less clear than it might seem at first sight. Fiott examining the transfers directive suggests that 
it has, in practice, had little impact on the EDEM, and that for key players it offered small gains 
and minimal adoption costs.45 Strikwerda looking at the procurement directive also claims big 
arms producing states thought it would make little legal difference and that the Commission 
would be flexible in its enforcement.46 This suggests that thus far at least hypothesis 1b has not 
fully been tested yet. The regulatory regime has yet to challenge the defence derogations 
allowed under Article 346 TEU, which apply for defence equipment procurement.47 
European Solidarity 
 2a) That rising levels of cooperation on research and procurement can be seen, defence 
industrial mergers encouraged and the end of national (but not European level) 
protectionist measures observed, and, 
2b) that increased trust and solidarity mean that defence interdependence through 
measures like pooling and sharing and specialisation is accepted at the European level. 
On the face of it, there is a natural logic to European collaboration on all matters related to the 
defence economy. Only superpowers can afford to produce technological advanced major 
weapons systems alone. However, as Smith points out, it is not always so straightforward: 
‘In practice, duplication of facilities, differences in requirements, coordination 
problems, lack of clear control and delays due to different budgetary systems all tend 
to increase the costs of collaborative projects.’48 
De Vore has questioned whether it is in fact possible for collaborative armaments projects to 
offer the benefits, it is claimed they should offer, given the problems found in their 
implementation.49 Certainly, the biggest two recent European projects, the Eurofighter and the 
A400M transport aircraft have been dogged by all the problems outlined by Smith.50 
 Here one might expect to see the institutions of the EU and NATO playing a key enabling role. 
In fact, despite much effort, neither the EU or NATO have been particularly successful, despite 
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multiple efforts in forging real rather than rhetorical commitment to European armaments 
cooperation from their member states.51 Financial crisis and the resulting cuts to defence 
spending have not brought the cooperation gains that Giegerich predicted.52 The European 
Defence agency reported that from 2008 to 2013 collaborative defence procurement spending 
fell, although the most recent estimated figures (for 2014 and 2015) show some improvement.53 
In November 2016, the Commission proposed a Defence Action Plan consisting of three 
elements; a European Defence Fund; European Investment Bank (EIB) investment coupled 
with EU co-financing for the modernisation of defence supply chains; and strengthening the 
Single Market for defence.54 At its 2016 Warsaw Summit NATO also committed to improving 
armaments cooperation.55 It remains to be seen whether these new initiatives are more 
successful than their predecessors. 
So why is there resistance on the part of member states? The paper has already showed that the 
appearance of a regulatory framework within the EU, prohibiting protectionist measures for 
indigenous defence firms, is somewhat illusory. The argument for European level 
rationalisation of defence industries has always been underpinned by the belief that existing 
overcapacity meant that only by rationalisation, could the defence technological and industrial 
base be maintained, and that this, even if it came with national losses, was in the long term 
interest of the states concerned. A 2015 study for the European Parliament found that European 
defence firms were heavily reliant on non-European export markets for their survival, but that 
the markets they have penetrated are often emerging arms producers themselves with hopes of 
attaining armaments autarky.56 The existing literature has not systematically investigated 
recent decisions on mergers and non-mergers to get a clearer picture of state motivations. Briani 
argued that maintaining highly skilled jobs was a key motivation for blocking mergers.57 This 
did appear to be Germany’s rationale for blocking the proposed merger between the then EADS 
(now Airbus) and BAE Systems in 2012, but Germany permitted the land industry merger 
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between KMW and French firm Nexter in 2015, despite similar issues on national interest being 
raised by critics.58 Other mergers seem to collapse due to the firm being deemed vital to the 
strategic interest of the state. Bellais’s evaluation of the naval industry posited that this was a 
major hindrance to rationalisation in this sector.59 The EU and to a lesser degree NATO have 
assumed that the strength of their respective alliances is such, that security of supply and 
strategic autonomy concerns at the national level would no longer matter. It is not though clear 
that this is how states understand the matter, which given divergent threat perceptions is 
understandable. The dividing line between protectionism and legitimate security of supply 
concern is not clear-cut.  
There are some examples where a higher level of trust is evident, but these are predominantly 
bilateral cooperation deals or small groups of states working together. The Franco-British 
defence cooperation under the 2010 Lancaster House agreements had a distinct industrial 
policy rationale from the start. This can be seen most clearly in the missile sector where a "One 
complex Weapons Industry" concept has been established, with the aim of rationalising the 
missile sector in Britain and France, with the aim of achieving 30% savings. The 
intergovernmental agreement in the field of missiles, which came into force in October 2016, 
means genuine interdependence in a highly strategic sector, and industrial rationalisation 
between the two countries with the establishment of eight centres of excellence within 
MBDA.60 Similar levels of interdependence between France and Britain can be seen in nuclear 
warhead testing. There is potential for the KMW / Nexter merger to produce a similar 
interdependence between France and Germany on tank production. Other examples might 
include NORDDEFCO, the format in which the Nordic states cooperate closely on defence or 
the joint Belgian-Dutch naval command, which has led to joint procurement of frigates.  
What trends does this analysis suggest? Firstly, if we consider the first hypothesis that we 
should be observing rising levels of cooperation on research and procurement and a 
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diminishing role for protectionist measures for national defence firms, the evidence suggests 
that despite much rhetoric in favour of cooperation, there is comparatively little action. 
However, this must be caveated by the acceptance of defence interdependence to a greater or 
lesser extent by smaller groups of likeminded states with similar capacities. It seems that trust 
and solidarity are more easily found in these settings. In many ways, the armaments specific 
decisions detailed here, fit well with Valasek’s conclusions about the conditions under which 
pooling and sharing defence resources might succeed.61  In descending order of importance, he 
suggests that these are similarity of strategic culture, trust and solidarity, forces of similar size 
and quality, level playing field for defence companies, clarity of intentions, seriousness of 
intent and low corruption; features that he thought the Franco-British agreements for example 
largely met. It would seem that for the moment at least European level trust and solidarity do 
not exist at the necessary levels. On the balance of the evidence, it appears that neither 
hypothesis 2a nor 2b really offer an accurate picture. 
Domination of Large State Interests 
3a) That the interests of the second-tier suppliers are so predominant that they comprise 
the vast majority of the EDEM and EDTIB, and thus system level capture is possible, 
and 
3b) that the market and regulatory regime distortion is such that smaller states are 
unable to act in their own interests, and thus are forced to accept the status quo. 
The third perspective suggests that rather than making a positive choice to make certain 
armaments policy choices, most states are effectively constrained by the system in which they 
operate. While behavioural change may be observable in the European market due to regulatory 
and other policy initiatives, in fact what we are seeing is negative rather than positive 
behavioural changes. Mawdsley argued that regulatory and policy initiatives from both the 
European Commission and the EDA favoured larger arms producing states and firms, and left 
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little room for smaller states to act in their national interest.62 This fits with Krause’s assertion 
that European second tier arms suppliers focussed on maintaining their status and thus 
dominating the European market.63 
Firstly, it is necessary to recognise that the core of the EDTIB and the EDEM are heavily 
concentrated in relatively few European states. These are the large arms producing states, 
known as the Framework Agreement Group, namely Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain 
and Sweden, plus to a lesser extent Poland. Béraud-Sudreau et al calculates that these seven 
states accounted for 89% of European arms industry turnover, 80% of defence expenditure and 
90% of expenditure on defence procurement and research in 2012.64 Amongst these states 
Britain, France and Germany vastly outpace the other four on all counts. This concentration is 
due to historical decisions but has an impact on how the EDEM and EDITB work now.65 In 
addition to the sheer importance of relatively few states and firms to the survival of an EDITB, 
the large firms concentrated in these states, most notably the largest prime contractors, BAE 
Systems, Airbus, Thales Group and Leonardo-Finmeccanica have substantial lobbying power. 
Strikwerda argues that for such large players, even where regulation may seem to level the 
playing field, in practice, procurement infractions are expected to be largely ignored.66 
The structural realities of the EDEM have undoubtedly made it hard for challenger arms 
producer states to emerge. Military or defence customers and the businesses that supply them 
operate in a highly unusual environment. Briani and Sartori summarise these conditions as 
follows: monopsony structure on the demand-side; monopoly/oligopoly structures on the 
supply-side; high R&D intensity and long-term production cycles; decreasing production costs; 
public subsidies in the R&D phase and associated spin-offs.In short, there are considerable 
barriers to entry for new firms and entry costs are high.67 Kiss argues that these challenges are 
increased for any Central or Eastern European state wanting to grow or even sustain indigenous 
defence industries, because the EDEM is a mature market with established supply chains with 
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known over-capacity, so offers fewer entry points.68 In particular, as Mawdsley predicted the 
classic entry method, of using offsets to require technology transfer, is made difficult by the 
EU procurement directive.69 Similarly, geopolitical changes have meant that procurement from 
non-European suppliers less attractive. Moreover, the denseness of the European 
institutionalisation of defence in both the EU and NATO make certain policy decisions less 
attractive to states. How viable is it to develop a viable twenty first century defence industry 
for states, which are constrained by alliance partnership responsibilities, regulatory restraints 
and whose regional market offers few export opportunities, because of the activities of existing 
arms producers? It is questionable whether any EU or NATO state could now achieve any 
degree of armaments autarky, while meeting their obligations as a member state, if they did not 
have a thriving DTIB already. While other European states may well share the techno-
nationalist ambitions of emerging arms producing states, their environment inhibits them. The 
evidence suggests therefore that there is indeed some support for both hypotheses 3a and 3b. 
Conclusion 
The paper started by raising the proposition that being part of a semi-regionalised defence 
economy might be expected to change the calculations that states make when deciding on their 
armaments policies. What this paper has argued is that in fact while behavioural change can be 
noted, it is not deep-rooted. If European states act differently to other states, it seems to be 
more about that regulatory environment making certain types of action more viable than others, 
rather than a conviction that certain goals no longer need to be pursued.  
Of the three perspectives considered, neither marketisation nor European solidarity seem 
sufficiently embedded to drive behavioural change although there is some evidence of greater 
trust / solidarity between near neighbours. While there is acceptance of the concepts of EDEM 
and EDITB, and toleration of a degree of regulation, states continue to make economically 
irrational policy choices, leading to fragmentation.70 This in turn contributes to the continuing 
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military capability gaps in European states’ contributions to both NATO and the EU. Largely, 
as work on the EDA has shown, European states are better at rhetoric than practice when it 
comes to armaments cooperation.71  
But nevertheless, there is some empirical evidence of changing behaviour. The tolerance of the 
European Commission’s efforts to begin to regulate the sector, Kiss’s account for the failure 
of any Central or Eastern European state to emerge as a major arms producer, or Kluth’s finding 
of abandonment of domestic suppliers in favour of other European firms suggest that something 
is different.72 The paper suggests that rather than finding evidence of deep-rooted behavioural 
change, it is probably more about the constraints placed on the majority of states by the 
particular concentration of armaments power in very few states. These states and their firms 
are vital for the survival of an EDEM or EDITB, and therefore their interests dominate the 
policy-making and regulatory processes. While there is consensus that the current situation is 
not sustainable in the long-term, extra-EU defence export success is allowing the larger arms-
producing states to postpone the inevitable. 
Other states struggle to maximise their own national interests in this environment, and thus the 
range of choices they might otherwise have had is restricted by regulation. The question of why 
smaller arms producers accept these constraints on their domestic armaments decision-making 
process is interesting. Realist analysis might argue like Escudé, regarding Argentina and the 
Condor II missile project, that it is the hierarchical regional system rather than domestic 
decision-making processes that determine smaller producers’ policy options73. Is such an 
argument sustainable in the European context? It remains a question for further research. 
This paper raises other questions. Firstly, there is a lack of knowledge about variation between 
states in their behaviour on armaments policy decisions. Are certain drivers consistent or not? 
The recent literature has concentrated on the EU level of decision-making, but the national 
level and NATO remain comparatively neglected. Why does it seem that states feel certain 
18 
 
defence industrial sectors are more sacrosanct than others when it comes to rationalisation 
decisions? If EU and NATO officials wish to encourage greater cooperation are the strategies 
presented here (marketisation and European solidarity) necessarily the right ones? Might there 
need to be an open acceptance that the biggest arms producing states need to be treated 
differently (as was in fact the belief in the 1990s)? How does Brexit complicate matters? 
Finally, does Europe differ fundamentally from other regional defence alliance or organisations 
for economic cooperation? How, if at all, are armaments policy decisions discussed at regional 
levels elsewhere?  
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